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ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES IN AFRICA
Laura A. Young1 and Korir Sing’Oei2
Introduction
In preparation for the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous 
Peoples, Indigenous community representatives from across Africa 
traveled to Nairobi for a conference in December 2012. The partici-
pants identified access to justice as a primary concern for Indigenous 
Peoples in Africa—whether political recognition and participation, 
criminal justice, or land rights, Indigenous representatives were clear 
that their communities struggle to access remedies for violations of 
their rights.3 This paper provides a broad overview of the situation for 
access to justice on the continent—from national legal frameworks, to 
judicial decisions, to regional human rights bodies, to transitional jus-
tice mechanisms. While African Indigenous Peoples’ access to justice 
concerns are similar to those of Indigenous Peoples around the globe, 
some specific issues emerge in the African context, such as how to 
understand the very existence of Indigenous Peoples on the continent. 
Ultimately, the paper makes clear that access to justice for Indigenous 
Peoples is more a political than legal issue, and that State political will 
to implement positive decisions in favor of Indigenous rights is one of 
the primary challenges for Indigenous Peoples.
1  The author is an attorney and human rights practitioner based in Nairobi who 
has conducted research and capacity building projects with numerous Indigenous 
communities across East Africa. She is founding partner of ProRights Consulting, 
www.prorightsconsulting.com.
2  The author is a litigator and human rights advocate who has represented 
multiple Indigenous communities in cases to vindicate their collective rights. He is 
co-founder of the Center for Minority Rights Development in Kenya.
3  See Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development Organisation (MPIDO), 
Proceedings Report: Africa Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples. (Nairobi: Dec. 2012).
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i. Do Indigenous Peoples exist in Africa?
The first challenge to access to justice for Indigenous Peoples in 
Africa is simple recognition of indigenousness as a valid identifier 
for communities with unique histories and relationships to territories. 
The existence of Indigenous Peoples in Africa remains a contested 
notion. An unstudied, yet common, refrain is that all black Africans 
are Indigenous to Africa. Accordingly, the concept of Indigenousness 
loses any meaning because it includes every black African. Scholars 
have presented a more nuanced critique identifying the risk of using 
the notion of Indigenousness in the contexts of ethnically diverse 
and divided societies. As Felix Ndahinda, a Rwandan scholar, points 
out, the “[i]mplications of indigenous identification for other groups 
in multi-ethnic countries remains one feature of indigenous rights 
discourse in need of further clarification.”4 Indeed, in regions where 
tribalism remains a major threat to peace and stability, the idea of 
Indigenousness can appear to feed such divisive notions. 
The colonial legacy in Africa and the legacy of pan-African strug-
gles for political independence created unique struggles for Indigenous 
Peoples. In recent decades, the concept of Indigenousness has begun 
a transition from a term that included all black Africans in contrast 
to white settlers, to a term that now includes certain self-identified 
African communities in contrast to their (often surrounding) African 
neighbors. This view appears to be acquiring resonance even among 
states such as the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) which recently 
adopted a law on Indigenous Peoples’ rights.5
Across the globe the definition of Indigenous Peoples has been con-
tested in part because the relationships between Indigenous Peoples 
4  FM Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa—a contested legal framework for 
empowerment of “marginalized” communities. (The Hague: Springer, 2011), p. 211.
5  Act No. 5-2011 of 25 February 2011, On the Promotion and Protection of 
Indigenous Populations. available at http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_news_
files/0368_Congolese_Legislation_on_Indigenous_Peoples.pdf. This law defines 
Indigenous Peoples thus: “the term Indigenous populations mean populations who 
are different from the national population by their cultural identity, lifestyle and 
extreme vulnerability.” This definition underscores two characteristics that are 
being deployed elsewhere in the continent: ethno-cultural distinctiveness from 
dominant populations and economic vulnerability.
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and dominant or mainstream groups in society vary from country 
to country. While the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples6 deliberately avoided developing any definition of 
Indigenous Peoples, a working definition of common characteristics 
was proposed by the United Nations and is relevant to the controver-
sies surrounding indigenousness in Africa:
“Indigenous communities, Peoples and nations are those 
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and 
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, con-
sider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies 
now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form 
at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined 
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of 
their continued existence as Peoples, in accordance with their 
own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.”7 
The critical issue in relation to identifying Indigenous Peoples in 
Africa is the focus on territory and distinctiveness. Africa traditionally 
has been and remains a continent of Peoples tied to their land, with 
distinct ethnic communities claiming certain territories. Colonial dom-
ination tended to enhance ethnic enclaves within arbitrary borders, 
often naming regions for the ethnic groups that were found within 
them when the settlers arrived. Migration of Peoples in response to 
climatic change and conflict has been a constant feature of African life 
for centuries; many African ethnic groups adopted nomadism as a tool 
of survival. All of these factors make the modern notion of Indigenous 
rights a complicated overlay for the African context. 
Despite this, many African communities have self-identified as 
Indigenous and have been recognized as Indigenous by the State. 
Traditional hunter-gatherer Batwa, residing in Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are some of the 
most widely recognized, and most marginalized, Indigenous Peoples 
6  UN GA Res. 61/295, 107th Plenary Meeting, 13 September 2007. 
7  Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1986).
92 Laura A. Young and Korir Sing’Oei
in Africa. Khoe-San, including their subgroups, reside primarily in the 
Northern and Western Cape regions of South Africa.8 Some San sub-
groups still rely in part on hunting and gathering, but all Indigenous 
groups in South Africa have had to adopt other livelihoods. Khoe-San 
have been recognized by multiple authorities, including the South 
African government, as the first inhabitants and self-identified Indig-
enous Peoples of South Africa.9 Highly multi-ethnic nations such as 
Nigeria and Kenya include multiple communities that self-identify as 
Indigenous Peoples. In Kenya for instance, where the census iden-
tifies well over 100 distinct ethno-linguistic groups,10 these include 
traditional hunter-gatherer communities such as Ogiek and Sengwer, 
multiple pastoralists groups such as Maasai, Turkana, Samburu, and 
Endorois, as well fisher Peoples such as Il Chamus.11 In North Africa, 
Imazighen are Indigenous inhabitants of the Maghreb residing in 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.12 Imazighen have preserved their lan-
guage, Tamazight, and have traditionally lived a semi-nomadic exis-
tence. In West Africa, Tuaregs self-identify as the Indigenous Peoples 
of the Sahel. These communities have clamored for more definitional 
clarity of Indigenity on the continent. 
In 2010, a Kenyan case before the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) responded to those con-
cerns. In its decision in the communication on Endorois Welfare 
Council v. Kenya, the African Commission confirmed guidelines on 
identifying Indigenous Peoples that were laid out by its Working 
Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities. The four 
criteria for identifying African Indigenous Peoples are: the occupation 
8  University of Pretoria Centre for Human Rights, South Africa: constitutional, 
legislative and administrative provisions concerning Indigenous Peoples. (Geneva: 
ILO, 2009), pp. 4–5.
9  Id., pp. 2–3.
10  Ethnic affiliation for the 2009 census is reported by the Kenya National Bureau 
of Statistics at http://www.knbs.or.ke/censusethnic.php.
11  MO Makoloo, Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity. 
London: Minority Rights Group International, 2005, http://www.minorityrights.
org/download.php?id=147.
12  M Martin, Moroccan Constitutional Reform: Berbers Say the Battle’s Just 




and use of a specific territory; the voluntary perpetuation of cultural 
distinctiveness; self-identification as a distinct collectivity, as well as 
recognition by other groups; and an experience of subjugation, mar-
ginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination.13 The African 
Commission further specified that Indigenous groups in Africa include 
hunter-gatherers, certain pastoralists, and other groups for which “sur-
vival of their particular way of life depends on access and rights to 
their traditional land and the natural resources thereon.”14
The African Commission’s definitional guidelines in the Endorois 
decision also highlight an important trend in the approach to Indige-
nousness in Africa. Faced with challenges from the State and other 
actors to the very notion of Indigenousness, many African Indigenous 
communities have instead adopted “marginalized” community as an 
alternative identifier. Using the proxy of marginality to address the 
concerns of Indigenous Peoples has proven less politically volatile for 
some groups, but also strips Indigenous Peoples of their recourse to 
international and regional standards, such as the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In Kenya for example, the proxy of 
marginality has been embedded in the Constitution (2010) in which 
“marginalized” groups and communities (of which Indigenous Peo-
ples are included along with multiple other categories) are given cer-
tain protections under law.15 The specific rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
however, are not recognized. 
Accordingly, the first access-to-justice challenge for Indigenous 
Peoples in Africa remains the very validity of the concept of indige-
nousness in the African historical, political and ethnic context. 
ii. African legal frameworks
Access to justice is a fundamental human right enshrined in African 
regional human rights instruments, specifically the African [Banjul] 
13  Communication No. 276 / 2003 – Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) and  Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council  v. Kenya, Decision on the Merits (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 2010), para. 149.
14  Id.
15  See, e.g., articles 260, 56 and 100 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010).
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Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights16 (ACHPR), as well as in the 
majority of African constitutions. For Indigenous Peoples in particu-
lar, effective access to justice has multiple pillars that should operate 
holistically to ensure that the most vulnerable groups in society can 
make use of the multiple systems they need to protect their rights. 
Accordingly, access to justice for Indigenous Peoples encompasses 
the constitution and laws, customary justice systems, formal justice 
mechanisms, administrative mechanisms, legal aid policy, and rights-
based education and awareness.
For Indigenous Peoples, access to justice ultimately depends on the 
interaction of these legal structures with their collective rights: the right 
to recognition, the right to land and natural resources, the right to devel-
opment, the right to participation, the right to non-discrimination and 
substantive equality, and the right to be free from violence. Although 
this paper cannot comprehensively address each of these topics for the 
entire continent, the following paragraphs use selected examples to give 
a broad view of access to justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa. 
ii.a. Formal legal frameworks
Across Africa, constitutional and legislative frameworks are rapidly 
transforming. This transformation has been largely positive, from a 
purely legal standpoint. Many African nations are now enjoying “third 
generation” constitutions having grown through first generation colo-
nial instruments, second generation independence-era constitutions, 
and, in the last two decades, third generation constitutions that have 
emerged out of transitions from military rule or other forms of political 
oppression and violence. These third-generation constitutions embrace 
third-generation human rights,17 encompassing protections not only for 
civil and political rights, but also for economic and social rights, as 
well as environmental rights and “collective” rights in some African 
16  OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986.
17  See Karel Vasak, Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts 
to give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO 
Courier. 30:11, Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, November 1977.
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countries. South Africa’s Constitution is widely acclaimed for such 
progressive human rights protections, but other nations also have 
demonstrated extremely progressive provisions in their constitutional 
frameworks that are directly relevant to the protection of the rights of 
Indigenous communities. The Ethiopian Constitution’s (1995) model 
of ethnic federalism was designed to protect cultural, linguistic and 
self-determination rights among others.18 The Constitution of Kenya 
(2010) protects first, second and third generation rights and specifies a 
cadre of rights applying only to marginalized communities and groups 
as noted above. The Constitution of Namibia (1998) provides clear 
protections for third generation rights.19 Most African constitutions 
also explicitly recognize customary law, to the extent that customary 
law does not conflict with constitutional human rights protections. 
It is in the translation of constitutional provisions into legislation 
where one first sees the challenges in implementation of Africa’s pro-
gressive constitutions. While many laws in African countries provide 
important protections that can apply to Indigenous Peoples,20 legislation 
often fails to live up to the constitutional ideals it is intended to make 
operational. Breakdown in the translation of constitutional principles 
into applicable legislation often has a deleterious impact on Indigenous 
Peoples in Africa.21 Indigenous Peoples often lack the political power 
to force changes in laws, either when they are proposed or after they 
are promulgated. Accordingly, third generation constitutions do not 
always translate into effective protection of third generation rights for 
Indigenous Peoples on the ground.
18  Tsegaye Regassa, Making Legal Sense of Human Rights: The Judicial Role in 
Protecting Human Rights in Ethiopia, Mizan Law Review. 3(2), pp. 288–330.
19  Oliver Ruppel, Third-generation human rights and the protection of the 
environment in Namibia, in Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Namibia. Eds. 
Horn N / Bösl A (Windhoek: Macmillan Publishers) (2008).
20  For instance, Namibia’s Traditional Authorities Act (No. 5 of 2000) provides 
important sovereignty for so-called “traditional” communities and their role in 
protection of natural environmental resources in Namibia. 
21  For example, in the context of Kenya, minority representation has been 
denuded by an unclear legal framework despite constitutional intent to promote 
inclusion of marginalized communities. See e.g. Korir Sing’Oei, Yash Ghai, Jill 
Ghai & Waikwa Wanyoike, Taking diversity seriously: minorities and political 
participation in Kenya. (Nairobi: Katiba Institute, Jan. 2013).
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ii.b. Interaction of formal and customary laws
While formal legal frameworks tend to undermine and dilute col-
lective rights, customary systems of dispute resolution, community 
governance, family law, and land management are still dominant in 
the lives of most African communities. This is particularly the case 
for African Indigenous Peoples. The recognition of customary law 
across Africa varies widely. Even in situations in which customary 
law is effectively recognized by the State, in practice it often will be 
recognized only to the extent that it manages affairs within the com-
munity or between community members. South Africa has developed 
a robust legislative system for recognition of customary law, yet it 
has found such recognition to be challenging. In 2010, for example, 
the Constitutional Court rejected the Communal Land Rights Act in 
its entirety.22 The act had been designed to provide enhanced security 
of tenure to communities in South Africa by vesting ownership in the 
community as a whole. 
Accordingly, customary law has proven to be a double edged sword 
for African Indigenous communities. On the one hand it provides crit-
ically important access to dispute resolution for community members 
who have no access to formal court systems because of distance, 
user-fees, and language or cultural barriers. Moreover, customary 
systems of negotiation and peace building have been effectively used 
to mitigate inter-community conflict, including cross-border conflicts, 
in some countries.23 Customary justice systems also perpetuate cul-
ture in communities that are under constant pressure to assimilate. 
On the other hand, Indigenous communities in Africa find that their 
systems of customary justice are under continual attack and regularly 
22  Tongoane and others v. Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and others. 
(CCT100/09) [2010] ZACC 10; 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC); 2010 (8) BCLR 741 (CC) 
(11 May 2010). 
23  See, e.g., Chopra, Tanja, Peace versus justice in northern Kenya: Dialectics 
of state and community laws, in Ghai, Yash, and Jill Cottrell, eds. Marginalized 
Communities and Access to Justice. Routledge, 2010; Laura A. Young and Korir 
Sing’Oei, Land, livelihoods and identity: Inter-community conflicts in East Africa. 
(London: Minority Rights Group International, 2011); Abraham Korir Sing’Oei, 
Customary Law and Conflict Resolution among Kenya’s Pastoralist Communities, 
Indigenous Affairs. (Copenhagen: IWIGIA, Jan-Feb 2010).
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are misconstrued. Attacks related to gender inequity and harmful 
practices are frequent from state institutions and the international 
human rights community. Harmful practices, such as trial by ordeal or 
corporal punishments have been banned, but often without providing 
viable and culturally valid alternatives.24 The treatment of Indigenous 
women in African customary justice systems often is analyzed with 
little understanding of the diversity and nuance within these systems 
and a lack of understanding of loci of power for women in Indigenous 
cultures. While the dangers of patriarchy and inequality are very real 
for Indigenous women (as they are for all women), the potential for 
African women to effectively exploit customary systems with which 
they are intimately familiar and which have a proven ability to adapt 
throughout changing contexts often has been underestimated.25Afri-
can Indigenous women live by, and challenge, customary law on a 
daily basis, continually pushing the boundaries of custom to change 
and recognize their rights in a changing world. 
The clash of custom and formal laws creates significant challenges 
for Indigenous Peoples’ access to justice. Indigenous communities 
also find themselves forced to interact with the formal or state legal 
system in many instances, in relation to land and natural resources 
disputes with the state, disputes with corporate bodies, and criminal 
prosecutions, for example. While the formal justice system may in 
some instances recognize certain aspects of custom, as a South Afri-
can scholar points out, formal or “State” justice systems have been 
unable so far to accommodate customary law in its difference, in its 
otherness.26 Attempting to fit dynamic, adaptive customary law sys-
tems into a box that can be contained within the legal reasoning of 
the formal system has often proven impossible. This can significantly 
hamper Indigenous Peoples’ access to justice because legal results 
become arbitrary and unpredictable.
24  For example, in Liberia, transitioning away from a system that made regular 
use of trial by ordeal has been an ongoing challenge in the post-conflict period. 
25  See, e.g., Laura A. Young, Challenges at the intersection of gender and 
ethnicity in Kenya. (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2012).
26 Wilmein Wicomb, The Emancipatory Potential of Customary Law for the Rights 
of Women to Access Land, Indigenous Affairs. (Copenhagen: IWGIA, Jan-Feb 2010).
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An effort to change these paradigms is ongoing in Uganda, for 
example, where a non-governmental organization is challenging the 
traditional notions of patriarchy in Indigenous customary law and 
also is attempting to make customary law more accessible when it 
intersects with the formal courts. In the Teso region of Uganda, the 
non-governmental Land and Equity Movement in Uganda (LEMU) 
builds upon Uganda’s constitutional recognition of customary land 
and inheritance rights to enhance protection for women’s tenure rights. 
The group worked closely with Iteso leaders over a period of years 
to document customary tenure rights and land management practices 
in Iteso clans. The result is a booklet that is available to community 
members, clan leaders, and to the Ugandan judiciary which is entitled 
Principles and Practices to provide for rights over customary land, 
procedure for sale of land and to provide for other land-related and 
land incidential [sic] matters in Teso. Designed to assist customary 
authorities and formal courts in making determinations about land 
conflicts, the Principles and Practices highlight the detailed ways in 
which Iteso regulate land holding, land use, and land transfers. 
The Principles and Practices are based on a consultative com-
munity process and integrate gender equity provisions in a way that 
makes sense for Iteso culture. The Principles and Practices contain 
specific provisions about the rights of Iteso widows—some of the 
most marginalized members of African communities—for example:
“l) All widows whether living alone or with a male partner 
from within the clan become heads of their families upon 
the death of their husbands with full rights to manage her 
land and the land of her children who are minors. 
m) The clan of the deceased husband shall appoint a man 
to protect the land rights of a widow from trespassers but 
the land rights of the widow shall not pass onto the officer 
appointed to protect the widow.”
A similar process of “restatement” of customary law is ongoing in 
Namibia, instigated not by an NGO but by a decision of the Namibian 
Council of Traditional Leaders.27 The restatement project has multiple 
27  George Mukundi Wachira, Applying Indigenous Peoples’ Customary Law in 
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goals, including preserving customary practices for future generations 
as well as bringing the customary laws of various Namibian com-
munities into alignment with human rights protections as specified 
in the Namibian Constitution. These types of efforts to enhance the 
recognition and understanding of customary principles will be critical 
to maintaining Indigenous Peoples’ identity through customary law 
while enhancing their access to legal remedies.
ii.c. Judicial protection of rights of minorities
Like minorities around the globe, Indigenous Peoples in Africa 
have sought recourse in formal courts. However, despite positive 
judicial decisions, many African States have stubbornly refused to be 
bound by the declarations of their own courts. While known for their 
inefficiency and corruption, courts in Africa “have become the theatre 
for dramatizing the plight of Indigenous rights and the sheer scale of 
their destitution.”28 The role of courts in protecting minority rights 
was aptly captured in the celebrated South African case of State v 
Makwanyane and Machunu, where the Court held that:
“The very reason for…. vesting the power of judicial review 
of all legislation in the courts was to protect the rights of 
minorities and others who cannot protect their rights ade-
quately through the democratic process. Those who are 
entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts 
and marginalized people of our society. It is only if there is 
a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest amongst 
us, that all of us can be secure that our own rights will be 
protected.”29
An example from Kenya, where many Indigenous communities have 
attempted to litigate violations of their rights, demonstrates state 
Order to Protect their Land Rights in Africa, Indigenous Affairs. (Copenhagen: 
IWGIA, Jan-Feb 2010).
28  Korir A Sing’Oei, Indigenous People in Africa: A Quest Yet Unmet in Hakima 
Abbas (ed) Africa’s Long Road to Rights: Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. (2007) 36 (Fahamu - Oxford: 
London).
29  State v Makwanyane and Machunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
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failures to recognize judicial decisions on Indigenous rights. The Il 
Chamus (also known as the Njemps), are a Kenyan Indigenous People 
with a distinct history and language living around the shores of Lake 
Baringo. Before the High Court of Kenya, they argued that they were 
an Indigenous minority group and that a member of their community 
had never and could never represent them in parliament because the 
demarcation of the constituency boundaries in Baringo made them a 
perpetual minority.30 Consequently, the Il Chamus contended that this 
demarcation violated their fundamental right to representation. The 
Constitutional bench31 declared:
“minorities of whatever time and shade are entitled to pro-
tection. And in the context of Constitution making it is to 
be remembered that the Constitution is being made for all, 
majorities and minorities alike and accordingly, the voice of 
all should be heard…what is called for in a society such as 
ours is a balance between majoritarian principle of one per-
son one vote and the equally democratic dictates of minority 
accommodation in the democratic process…”
The Constitutional bench further held that:
• The Il Chamus are a unique cohesive homogenous and a 
cultural distinct minority being. “A group numerically inferior 
to the rest of the population of a state, and in a non-dominant 
position whose members—being nationals of the state—poses 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, 
a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religions and language.”32 
• The Il Chamus have the right to influence the formulation 
and implementation of public policy, and to be represented by 
30  Kenya High Court Civil Application 305/2004 Rangal Lemaiguran and Others 
v Attorney General and others (Per J.G. Nyamu J. and M.J. Anyara Emukule J.).
31  Kenya at the time had no permanent constitutional court and used administrative 
powers granted to the Chief Justice to appoint a constitutional bench whenever an 
application of a constitutional nature was brought before the High Court.
32  The definition was proposed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
Fransesco Capotorti of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the context of Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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people belonging to the same social, cultural and economic 
context as themselves. The Electoral Commission of Kenya 
had a duty to protect minority interests—the principle of 
one-man one vote notwithstanding. It should not submerge 
minority groups in drawn boundaries. 
• For a political system to be truly democratic, it has to allow 
minorities a voice of their own, to articulate their distinct 
concerns and seek redress and thereby lay a sure base for 
deliberative democracy. Participation is a lifeline of democracy 
and a clear constitutional recognition of a minority—to 
participate in the State’s political process and to influence 
State Policies. 
• The Il Chamus’ rights to exist, be treated without discrimination, 
the preservation of their cultural identity, freedom of 
conscience, freedom of association and their participation in 
public life had been violated. 
The Court then directed the Electoral Commission of Kenya to 
take into account all the requirements set out in section 42 of the then 
Constitution of Kenya at its next Boundary Review and in particular 
ensure adequate representation of sparsely- populated rural areas, 
population trends, and community of interest, including those of 
minorities especially the Il Chamus. Despite this judicial determina-
tion, more than five years later the Il Chamus have yet to enjoy the 
political recognition ordered by the court due to the Kenyan state’s 
failure to abide by the judgment.
These concerns are not limited to East Africa. In Southern Africa, 
the Basarwa, a hunting gathering and mobile minority and Indige-
nous community resident within the Central Kalahari Game Reserve33 
sought a High Court declaration that their removal from the Reserve 
was unlawful and unconstitutional and the termination by the Botswana 
government of provision of water and other essential services within 
the Reserve amounted to a deprivation of the right to life under the 
33  Similar in size to Belgium, the Reserve is home to a significant population of 
wildlife, including antelopes such as gemsbok, hartebeest, eland, giraffe, kudu and 
wildebeest and carnivores such as lion, leopard, cheetah and hyenas.
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Botswana constitution and international law.34 The court acknowledged 
that there were clear structural bases for the historical disadvantage of 
the community in the social, economic and political social strata:
“The language employed by the Colonial Government 
makes reference to the Basarwa and the Bakgalagadi as 
‘little people’, ‘uncivilized’ and ‘wild’…The Colonial Gov-
ernment’s failure to carve out a ‘tribal territory’ for either 
group, in the same way that it carved out ‘tribal territories’ 
or ‘native reserves’ for some ethnic groups in the then Bech-
uanaland Protectorate.”35
Accepting the Basarwa’s arguments, the court recognized their 
claims of discrimination and State failures: 
“The Basarwa and to some extent the Bakgalagadi, belong 
to an ethnic group that is not socially and politically organ-
ised in the same manner as the majority of other Tswana 
speaking ethnic groups and the importance of this is that 
programmes and projects that have worked with other 
groups in the country will not necessarily work when sim-
ply cut and pasted to the Applicants’ situation.”36
It therefore found “…that creation of the [Reserve] did not extinguish 
the ‘native title’ of the Bushmen to the [Reserve]…[and therefore] 
neither the declaration of the Ghanzi Crown land nor of CKGR extin-
guished the native rights of the Bushmen to [Reserve].”37 While the 
State, in this case the Botswana government, “saw the economic-de-
velopment potential, the health benefits and the educational opportu-
nities to the children of the Applicants (Basarwa), of the relocations, 
[it] failed to see the cultural and social upheavals that could result.”38 
Like, their Il Chamus counterpart in Kenya, the decision of the court 
34  Botswana High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 52 of 2002 Roy Sesane 
and Anor v. The Attorney General of Botswana. Per Dipotelo J., Dow J., and 
Phumaphi J. (Delivered on December 13, 2006).
35  Judgment of Dow J. at p. 165.
36  Supra, note 34, pp. 231–232.
37  Supra, note 34, p. 337.
38  Supra, note 34, p. 243.
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has not only been ignored by the Botswana government, but has also 
been actively resisted.39
iii. African regional human rights mechanisms
Given the failures of African States in many instances to effectively 
implement their own constitutions or to abide by the decisions of their 
own courts, African Indigenous Peoples have sought access to justice 
in other fora. The African regional human rights system, including 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) and the African Court, has made rapid strides to recog-
nize and protect the unique collective rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Although the African human rights system is a creation of African 
States through the African Union, the African human rights system’s 
approach to Indigenous Peoples’ rights has far outstripped the comfort 
level of many African governments.
The main African human rights treaty is the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).40 The African Charter 
has been signed by 53 African countries and has been supplemented 
by protocols on the rights of women and on the rights of the African 
child. The African Charter is among the most progressive human rights 
instruments in the world because of its clear recognition of not only 
civil-political and social-economic rights, but also Peoples’ rights.
iii.a. The African Commission
The African Commission was established as the monitoring and 
enforcement body for the African Charter. The Commission has both 
a promotional and protective mandate with regard to the rights pro-
tected in the Charter; it not only examines and educates about human 
39  Hitchcock Robert & K. Rodney, Tourism, Conservation, and Culture 
in the Kalahari Desert, Botswana, Cultural Survival. 2010 at http://www.
culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article.
40 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986.
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rights but receives complaints (communications) from individuals and 
organizations in relation to violations.41
During the past decade, the African Commission has made sig-
nificant progress in interpreting and addressing the human rights 
situation of Indigenous Peoples in Africa. The African Com mission’s 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities (WGIP), 
established in 2001, has been the focal point for these efforts.42 Early 
on, the WGIP explored the place of Indigenous rights norms in the 
continent’s human rights framework and worked to raise awareness 
about the human rights situation of Indigenous Peoples. The seminal 
Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities43 issued in 2005 highlighted the 
significant and widespread violations of Indigenous Peoples’ collec-
tive rights, and raised the profile of communities that had previously 
been unknown or unrecognized as Indigenous Peoples. 
One section of the WGIP’s report specifically addresses denial of 
justice to Indigenous Peoples.44 The report primarily focused on dis-
criminatory treatment of Indigenous Peoples in the criminal justice 
systems of multiple African countries, still an important issue today. 
The report highlighted the common pattern across Africa of crimi-
nalizing Indigenous Peoples’ attempts to access traditional territory 
from which they have been forcibly removed. This practice of arrests, 
harassment, denial of bail, and then prosecution of Indigenous Peoples 
who carry out their traditional practices on their traditional territory 
has been particularly prevalent in regard to hunter-gatherers, such as 
Batwa in Uganda and DRC, Ogiek in Kenya, and San in Botswana. 
For Indigenous pastoralists (many of whose communities were split 
by arbitrary borders during colonial map-drawing exercises) arrests 
and harassment on the basis of cross-border movement also was iden-
tified by the Report as a significant denial of justice concern. 
41  Id., art. 30. Complaints can be brought to the commission only after exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. 
42  ACHPR Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ Communities in 
Africa (Resolution 51), 6 November 2000.
43  Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities, Adopted by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session (2003), (published in 2005).
44 Id., section 2.4.
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Adoption and publication of the WGIP Report paved the way for 
the expansion of the mandate of the WGIP. The WGIP now gathers, 
requests, receives and exchanges information and communica tions 
from all relevant sources, including Governments, Indigenous pop-
ulations and their communities and organizations on violations of 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms; it undertakes country 
visits to study the human rights situation of Indigenous populations/
communities; it formulates recommendations and proposals on appro-
priate measures and activities to prevent and remedy violations of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous popula tions/
communities; and it cooperates with other international and regional 
human rights mechanisms, institutions and organizations.
Despite the WGIP not being an adjudicative mechanism, its role in 
raising awareness of the existence and rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
Africa has been extremely important for Indigenous Peoples’ access 
to justice on the continent. Specifically, the 2005 WGIP Report laid 
the groundwork for adjudication of Indigenous Peoples’ rights at the 
African Commission and at the African Court. 
As described above, the African Commission’s landmark 2010 
decision in the Endorois communication45 was a huge step forward for 
Indigenous Peoples’ recognition on the continent. Apart from crafting 
clear indicators for Indigenousness in Africa, this decision recognized 
the validity of col lectively held Indigenous ancestral lands as well 
as Indigenous communities’ right to natural resources and self-de-
termined development. As noted earlier, however, this decision has 
outstripped the national government’s willingness and ability to take 
action on Indigenous Peoples’ rights in Kenya. More than three years 
after the case was determined by the African Commission, the Kenyan 
government has not taken any concrete steps toward implementation 
of the Commission’s recommendations despite continual advocacy by 
the Endorois community and their allies.
45  Communication No. 276/2003, Centre for Minority Rights Development & 
Minority Rights Group International (on behalf of the Endorois community) v. 
Kenya (2010).
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iii.b. The African Court
The African Union (AU) adopted the Protocol to the African 
Charter on June 10, 1998 (the Protocol). The Protocol establishes the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) to “rein-
force and complement the functions of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights.”46 Unlike the African Commission which 
issues recommendations to States, the African Court issues binding 
judgments. The Protocol also states that “the jurisdiction of the Court 
shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the African Charter, this Protocol 
and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned.”47 Accordingly, the African Court has broad discretion to 
receive submissions, particularly when governments fail to comply 
with the recommendations of the African Commission. Moreover, the 
African Court will apply the African Charter as well as other treaties 
ratified by the state concerned when determining a dispute.48 These 
developments are impor tant for Indigenous Peoples whose rights 
have been articulated both in the African Charter and in several other 
African Union treaties such as the Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Con-
vention),49 the Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources,50 and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of 
Women in Africa.51 The African Court’s sources of law also include 
United Nations treaties ratified by the African state, such as the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Conven tion on the Elimination of of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, both of which have been inter preted in favor of the protection of 
Indigenous rights.
46  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Es tablishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9, 1998, 
OAU Doc. OAU/ LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), at Preamble.
47  Id., art. 3.
48  Id., art. 7.
49  Adopted by Special Session of the African Union, 22 October 2009.
50  Adopted at the Second Ordinary Session of the African Union, 11 July 2003.
51  Adopted at the Second Ordinary Session of the African Union, 11 July 2003. 
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The African Court is in the very early stages of it operation. One 
of the first cases it accepted was an Indigenous rights case in 2012. 
The case relates to the Ogiek Indigenous hunter-gatherers of the Mau 
Forest in Kenya. Like many forest dwelling Indigenous Peoples, the 
Ogiek have been displaced in waves of evictions over the decades, in 
the name of forest conservation. International efforts to create a sys-
tem of carbon trading and carbon credits have accelerated the process. 
Conservation of the forest, however, has not been the outcome of Ogiek 
evictions. On the contrary, huge tracts of forest have been settled by 
non-Ogiek communities with the consent of the government of Kenya 
and logging of the Mau Forest continues to date. Ogiek legal cases in the 
Kenyan courts languished for decades without resolution, and in 2009 
the community brought a communication to the African Commission. 
The Commission promptly issued provisional measures, enjoining the 
Kenyan government from further evictions of the Ogiek or from further 
destruction or settlement in the Mau Forest. When the Kenyan govern-
ment violated the provisional measures put in place by the Commission, 
the Commission referred the case to the African Court. 
The Ogiek case at the African Court is set for trial in 2014. It is a 
pivotal case related to access to justice for Indigenous Peoples on the 
continent. The case is primed to develop precedent on a number of 
issues, such as the right to recognition as an Indigenous community, 
the right to own and manage land, territory and resources, the right to 
development, and principles related to the intersection of indigenous 
rights and environmental conservation.
Moreover, assuming that the Ogiek are successful in proving at least 
some of their claims, the African Court’s judgment in this case will be a 
major test for the African human rights system in general. The case will 
provide a platform to assess whether an African State will comply with 
its obligations under the protocol that established the Court, namely to 
abide by the judgments and orders of the Court. Already, the Kenyan 
government has failed to comply with provisional orders issued by the 
Court which reiterated the provisional measures issued by the Commis-
sion. The behavior of the Kenyan State and the Court’s response will 
be an important benchmark by which to measure the commitment of 
African governments to the rule of law and access to justice. 
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iv. Transitional justice mechanisms
The nexus between transitional justice in Africa and Indigenous 
Peoples in countries undergoing transition has not been extensively 
explored, but it is another important platform through which Indig-
enous groups are seeking redress for historical and contemporary 
wrongs in Africa. Transitional justice is a victim-centered field of 
practice and inquiry. The rights of victims, including the right to truth, 
the right to justice, the right to reparation, and the right to guarantees 
of non-repetition, form the guiding principles of transitional justice 
efforts. Tools of transitional justice include specialized prosecutions, 
truth seeking, amnesty, systems reform, vetting, lustration, memorials, 
official apologies, and reparations.52 In the past decades, transitional 
justice has moved from the “exception to the norm to become a para-
digm of rule of law.”53
In the African context, transitional justice in the past three decades 
has emerged as a full-fledged movement mirroring the field’s global 
dominance. Truth commissions and post-transition prosecutions 
have been implemented across Africa.54 Truth commissions in par-
ticular have provided an important context in which to consider how 
Indigenous Peoples can gain redress for violations of their rights. The 
treatment of Indigenous Peoples in post-conflict transitional justice 
processes reflects a continuum of the way in which governments have 
approached the notion of Indigenousness in Africa. The transitional 
justice processes in Rwanda, South Africa, Kenya, and Morocco pro-
vide useful examples.
In Rwanda and South Africa, the transitional justice processes led 
to a denial of indigenous identity in the service of other political goals. 
After the genocide in that country, Rwanda embarked on multiple transi-
tional justice initiatives, including an international criminal tribunal, the 
52  L Bickford, Transitional Justice, in The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity. 2004, 1045–47.
53  R Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 
16, 2003, p. 71.
54  For information about the multiple truth commissions across Africa 
visit the United States Institute for Peace’s Margarita S. Studemeister 
Truth Commissions Digital Collection at http://www.usip.org/publications/
truth-commission-digital-collection. 
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local gacaca justice mechanism, a truth and reconciliation commission 
which is now a permanent body, and extensive memorialization through 
museums and memorial sites around the country. Marginalized for cen-
turies, the traditionally forest-dwelling Batwa have largely been left out 
of the dominant Hutu-Tutsi narrative of the genocide in Rwanda. The 
dominant narrative created out of Rwanda’s transition led to an official 
policy of strict non-discrimination, but in practice went to the extreme 
of absolute denial of differential identity based on ethnicity. Batwa 
expressed strong concerns about how the local gacaca prosecutorial 
mechanism, put in place to deal with genocide perpetrators, would pro-
tect minority rights; there were no Batwa elected judges for the gacaca 
for example.55 Indeed, a New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) African Peer Review Mechanism report for Rwanda found 
that the government’s actions with respect to the Batwa during the tran-
sitional justice process were based on “a policy of assimilation…[and] 
a desire to obliterate distinctive identities and to integrate all into some 
mainstream socio-economic fabric of the country.”56
The South African transition from apartheid to democracy was 
accompanied by multiple transitional justice measures, including 
a new constitution, institutional reforms, and a truth commission 
that operated from 1995–2002 (the latter four years being primarily 
amnesty application hearings). Despite the multitude of literature 
related to transitional justice in South Africa, especially the truth com-
mission, there is hardly a mention of South Africa’s first inhabitants, 
the Indigenous Khoe-San.57 As with other truth commissions, the 
“terms and categories the TRC adopted served to organize, summon 
and exclude particular identities.”58 The TRC used the term “indige-
nous” in its report as a counterpoint to the category of white settlers, 
55  Twa Community Concerned Over Gacaca System, IRIN News. June 6, 2001, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=21981.
56  APRM, Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda, June 2006, para. 153.
57  The Khoe-San are recognized by multiple authorities as the first inhabitants 
and the self-identified Indigenous Peoples of South Africa. See, e.g., University 
of Pretoria Centre for Human Rights, South Africa : constitutional, legislative and 
administrative provisions concerning indigenous Peoples. (Geneva: ILO, 2009), 2–3.
58  Fullard & Rousseau 2010, Truth Telling, Identities, and Power in South Africa and 
Guatemala, in Identities in Transition:Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided 
Societies. ed. Paige Arthur (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 72.
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setting up a dichotomous narrative between state “authorities” and an 
“indigenous liberation movement.”59 This dichotomy appropriated 
Indigenous identity away from the Khoe-San in the service of other 
political interests in the post-apartheid era, specifically countering the 
white-settler narrative that Bantu Africans were migrants to South 
Africa. Moreover, the TRC interpreted its mandate in a manner that 
excluded many types of human rights violations that disproportionately 
impact Indigenous Peoples. The TRC stated that despite expectations 
to the contrary the TRC would not investigate “forced removals of 
people from their land” and thus victims of those types of violations 
would be excluded from reparations.60 Indeed, the UN Special Rap-
porteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of Indigenous Peoples noted in a 2005 report that Indigenous Peo-
ples’ representatives in South Africa complained “that they were not 
included in the negotiations leading to the democratic transition, nor 
in the new national constitution nor in the Truth and Reconciliation 
process.”61 In these contexts, transitional justice mechanisms did little 
to enhance Indigenous Peoples’ access to justice.
In contrast, however, truth commissions elsewhere have taken 
more account of the rights of Indigenous Peoples. The transitional 
justice mechanisms operating in Kenya, in response to post-election 
violence in 2007–08, included a new constitution that has mandated 
an extensive slate of institutional reforms, a truth commission, memo-
rialization efforts, and an international criminal court prosecution. 
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) provided 
the most explicit forum for the expression of Indigenous issues. The 
mandate of the Kenyan TJRC included a requirement that the commis-
sion “inquire into and establish the reality or otherwise of perceived 
economic marginalization of communities and make recommenda-
tions on how to address the marginalization.”62 Moreover, the TJRC 
was mandated to “inquire into the root causes of ethnic tensions and 
59  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Final Report, vol. II 
(1998), para. 74.
60  Ibid., para. 48–49.
61  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Mission to 
South Africa, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.2, December 15, 2005, para. 32.
62  The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008, art. 6(p).
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make recommendations on the promotion of healing, reconciliation 
and co-existence among ethnic communities.”63 The TJRC interpreted 
this mandate in a way that allowed for significant interaction with 
Indigenous Peoples across Kenya.
The TJRC conducted outreach in Indigenous communities, hired 
Indigenous staff members, and in public hearings heard a substantial 
number of grievances from Indigenous Peoples. Leaders of Indigenous 
groups appeared on behalf of their communities to present their claims 
relative to ancestral lands, to discuss the roots of conflicts with neigh-
bouring communities, and to highlight human rights violations by the 
State and corporations. Indigenous Peoples appeared before the TJRC 
in traditional dress, spoke in their community’s language, and specif-
ically distinguished themselves from other ethnic communities who 
also testified to marginalization but who were not the “Indigenous” 
inhabitants of the land in pre-colonial days. The TJRC Final Report 
highlights the extensive concerns of Indigenous communities across 
Kenya, including discrimination, marginalization, and insecurity. 
The final report also highlights the Endorois decision as well as the Il 
Chamus political representation case and recommends that the State 
take action to urgently implement those decisions. The government is 
currently considering the process of implementation of the report. 
In Morocco, although the truth commission did not explicitly have a 
mandate to deal with Indigenous Peoples’ concerns, the process of the 
ongoing transition in that country has been driven in substantial part 
by the demands of the Imazighen (Berbers), the Indigenous inhabitants 
of the Maghreb. Morocco’s truth commission, known as the IER 
(Instance Equité et Réconciliation), operated from December 2004 
until November 2005. A member of the indigenous Berber community 
was appointed to lead the IER as its president, along with 16 other 
commission members.64 The IER’s mandate stretched from 1956 to 
1999 and was focused on establishing the truth about past violations, 
providing reparations to victims and families, and recommending 
measures aimed to prevent future abuses. However, the violations that 
the IER was mandated to address included only arbitrary detention 
63  Ibid., art.6(s).
64  John Hursh, Moving toward Democracy in Morocco?, ASPJ AFRICA & 
FRANCOPHONIE. 2010, pp. 64–78.
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and disappearances. While many in Moroccan civil society were 
disappointed with the limited mandate of the IER and its narrow results, 
the advocacy and political process leading to its creation included 
several gains for Indigenous identity such as enhanced language and 
cultural rights. The Kenyan and Moroccan examples demonstrate that 
the recognition of Indigenous identity can be an important factor in 
peaceful transition and, indeed, that African Indigenous Peoples can 
be active participants and leaders in transitional justice processes. 
However, from an access to justice perspective, it remains to be 
seen—as with the implementation of progressive constitutions—how 
far implementation of truth commission reports and recommendations 
will substantively impact the justice concerns of Indigenous Peoples 
in Africa. 
Conclusion
In Africa, the rights of Indigenous Peoples are increasingly being 
recognized in national constitutional frameworks, in some national 
laws, and in judicial decisions. However, access to justice remains 
a substantial challenge for Indigenous Peoples. Although Indigenous 
Peoples may be recognized on a formal legal level, substantive 
recognition continues to lag behind official law and policy. African 
regional human rights mechanisms have been progressive in addressing 
the rights of Indigenous Peoples, such as in the Endorois decision, but 
the problem of African States abiding by the decisions of these human 
rights mechanisms remains. Moreover, there have been substantial 
challenges in African States abiding by the judicial decisions of their 
own national courts when those decisions have supported the rights 
of Indigenous communities. For justice concerns within communities, 
custom remains a significant route for access to justice, though these 
systems are regularly under threat and have not been effectively 
integrated into national systems. The problem of access to justice is 
often a problem of political will and is intimately linked to the history 
of the concept of Indigenousness in Africa. African States remain 
reluctant to effectively address the concerns and claims of Indigenous 
Peoples and, accordingly, access to justice remains elusive. 
